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知識は「正当化された真なる信念」に条件を足す形で分析できるか？（ゲティア問題）

Can knowledge be analysed as justified true belief plus further conditions?

philosophyepistemologyanalysis-of-knowledge

問題文

信念・真・正当化、およびそれらに付け加える条件によって、ゲティア型の反例を受けない知識の分析が与えられるかを決定せよ。

Decide whether there is an analysis of knowledge in terms of belief, truth, justification and further conditions that is immune to Gettier-style counterexamples.

背景

Gettier's two-page paper produced cases of justified true belief that are not knowledge. Sixty years of proposed repairs have each met counterexamples, and Zagzebski gives a recipe for generating a counterexample against any analysis that keeps justification fallible.

アプローチ · 2 件

解決したかどうかは、問いではなくアプローチごとに決まります。Atlas は判定しません。外部の判定者が何をしたかを記録します。

  • Adding a fourth condition

    専門家の合意

    到達状況
    判定者なし・判定がつかない
    判定者
    none: philosophical analyses are adjudicated by the literature, not by a decision procedure · 判定手続きなし
    定式化
    Add a condition - no false lemmas, defeasibility, causal connection, sensitivity, safety, or a virtue condition - that rules out the counterexamples.問いと同値

    保たれているもの

    • Keeps the target of analysis: knowledge as a state that entails true belief

    弱まっているもの

    • Each proposed condition has met counterexamples of its own in the literature

    加えられた仮定・条件

    • Whichever condition is chosen, plus the theoretical apparatus it needs

    Treated here as one approach rather than five, because the proposals share the same closed road: Zagzebski's recipe applies to all of them.

    閉じた道

    • Zagzebski shows that any analysis on which justification is fallible but not entailing truth admits a Gettier case by construction: take a case where justification fails to reach truth, then add luck that restores truth. The repair-by-addition route is closed as a family, not case by case.無条件
      • paperdoi:10.2307/2220147L. Zagzebski, The inescapability of Gettier problems, Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994) 65-73

    証拠

    • paperdoi:10.2307/2024268A. Goldman, A causal theory of knowing, J. Philosophy 64 (1967) 357-372
    • otherR. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press (1981), ch. 3The sensitivity (tracking) condition
    • otherE. Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press (2007)Virtue epistemology; the safety condition appears in ch. 5

  • Knowledge first

    問いの否定

    到達状況
    問いそのものを否定する立場
    判定者
    none: the position denies the question is well posed · 判定手続きなし

    差分（このアプローチが問いの何を保ち、何を弱めるか）はまだ書かれていません。人類審査で書きます。

    閉じた道

    • If knowledge is unanalysable, the analysis project fails by construction; the position is a live one in the literature and is not itself refuted.無条件
      • otherT. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press (2000)Knowledge first: knowledge is unanalysable, so the project of analysing it is rejected

    証拠

    • otherT. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press (2000)Knowledge first: knowledge is unanalysable, so the project of analysing it is rejected

出典

  • paperdoi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121E. Gettier, Is justified true belief knowledge?, Analysis 23 (1963) 121-123
  • otherR. K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research, Princeton University Press (1983)Survey of post-Gettier analyses and their counterexamples

記録

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https://atlasalt.com/q/191e3694-2900-43ec-9df1-b3350b54e9ac
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2026-09-17
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2026-09-19
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